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Disability and Skill Mismatch
* 
 
This paper integrates two strands of literature on overskilling and disability using the 2004 
British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). It finds that the disabled are 
significantly more likely to be mismatched in the labour market, to suffer from a pay penalty 
and to have lower job satisfaction, the effects being stronger for the work-limited disabled. 
Giving workers more discretion over how they perform their work would significantly reduce 
these negative effects. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper attempts to combine two different strands of the labour economics 
literature. First, there is now a growing literature on the economic impact of disability. 
The rate of disability among the working age population ranges considerably among 
EU member states, from 6.6% in Italy to 32.2% in Finland in 2002 (Jones, Latreille 
and Sloane, 2007). This makes it numerically much more important, for instance, than 
membership of various ethnic minorities in most countries, an issue on which there is 
a much more extensive literature. Employment rates for the disabled are much lower 
than for the non-disabled, varying among OECD countries in the late 1990s for those 
of working age from 20.8% in Poland against 71.2% for the non-disabled, to 62.2% in 
Switzerland against 79.1% for the non-disabled. Understanding the reasons for this 
and for the disability earnings gap has preoccupied much of the existing literature. 
Following DeLeire (2001) and Jones, Latreille and Sloane (2006) it has become 
common to distinguish between work-limited and non-work-limited disabled, with the 
disability affecting the amount and nature of work that the individual can do only in 
the former case. This approach attempts to distinguish between discrimination and the 
unobserved impact of disability on productivity as explanations for their labour 
market disadvantage. The evidence suggests the latter effect is more important 
(DeLeire, 2001, Jones et al. 2006).
1  
 
A second strand of literature has examined skill mismatch, first concentrating on 
overeducation (and to a lesser extent undereducation), and finding that there are pay 
                                                 
1 Assuming that those who report no work limitations do not have lower productivity as a result of their 
health impairment compared to the non-disabled, one can interpret the unexplained residual in an 
Oaxaca-type decomposition as an estimate of discrimination. 
   3
penalties to being overeducated (see Sloane, Battu and Seaman, 1999) and at the same 
time reductions in job satisfaction (see Battu, Belfield and Sloane, 1999, Chevalier, 
2003, Fleming and Kler, 2007). More recently attention has focused on overskilling as 
new data sets have become available which include a relevant question, such as the 
Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel survey, the 
British Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 2004 and The Flexible Professional 
in the Knowledge Society (REFLEX) survey for a number of European countries (see 
Allan and Van der Velden, 2001, Green and McIntosh, 2007, McGuinness and 
Wooden, 2009, and Mavromaras et al., forthcoming). These find strong negative 
effects of overskilling on both wages and job satisfaction. 
 
The relationship between education or skill mismatch and disability in the labour 
market has generally been ignored in the earlier literature, even to the extent of not 
always controlling for disability in the regression analysis.
2 One recent exception to 
this is Blazquez and Malo (2005) who use Spanish data from the European 
Community Household Panel 1995-2000. They, however, find no significant 
relationship between disability and educational mismatch, which is surprising given, 
as they note, there are good reasons to expect the problem of overeducation to be 
more acute for the disabled.  
 
In a similar manner to other minority groups, the presence of employer discrimination 
reduces the probability of employment, suggesting, therefore, that the disabled may be 
more likely to accept employment which does not fully utilise their skills or 
                                                 
2 This is despite interest in differences in overeducation among other minority groups including ethnic 
groups (see, for example, Battu and Sloane, 2004).   4
qualifications.
3 A similar argument can also be made with regard to the unobserved 
productivity effect of a disability, which, by lowering productivity (for a given set of 
educational characteristics), would also reduce employment prospects. However, 
another argument used in the context of ethnic minorities by Battu and Sloane (2004) 
is that spatial constraints on job search increase the probability of educational 
mismatch. Constraints on job search for the disabled may actually be 
multidimensional, including not only in terms of geographical location, but also the 
physical (or emotional) demands of employment, hours of work and accessibility. All 
of these will mean the disabled are searching for a smaller pool of jobs and are more 
at risk of accepting ‘mismatched’ employment.
4 
 
In this paper we make use of WERS 2004 to assess the incidence of over and 
underskilling for the disabled, differentiated according to whether or not the disability 
is work related, compared to the effect on the non-disabled. In short, we find that the 
disabled are more prone to both over and underskilling than the non-disabled. We 
consider the consequences of this skill mismatch on wages and job satisfaction and 
find the adverse effect of overskilling on wages is particularly acute for the work- 
limited disabled.  
 
2. THE  DATA 
 
WERS 2004 is a cross-section data set involving a national sample of interviews with 
managers from 2,293 establishments with at least five workers. In addition, up to 25 
                                                 
3 The precise form of discrimination is not important in this regard as prejudice or statistical 
discrimination in hiring or in promotion all potentially increase the probability of skill mismatch.  
4 Jones and Latreille (2006) find that a greater percentage of the work-limited disabled live and work in 
the same local authority district and Prescott-Clarke (1990) documents a wide range of constraints 
experienced by the disabled.    5
employees at each workplace were randomly selected for the employee survey and we 
have a total of 22,173 usable responses.
5 Employees were asked: Do you have any 
long-term illness, health problem or disability? By long-term, we mean that it can be 
expected to last more than one year. Those who respond positively to this are also 
asked: Does this illness or disability affect the amount or type of work you can do?  
We define the work-limited as those who have positive responses to both questions. 
Those who respond positively to the first, but not the second, question are defined as 
non-work-limited and those who do not have a long-term health problem form the 
non-disabled group.
6 This results in 11.9% of employees being classed as disabled, 
with 4.5% being work-limited and 7.4% non-work-limited. This is lower than 
previous estimates of the population share, consistent with the low rate of labour 
market participation among the disabled and this should be born in mind when 
considering the results presented in this paper.
7 
 
Employees were also asked a direct question about overskilling, the advantages of 
which, relative to the more typical measures of overeducation, are outlined by 
McGuinness and Wooden (2009). Specifically they were asked How well do the work 
skills you personally have match the skills you need to do your present job?. Their 
response is listed on a five point scale as much higher, a bit higher, about the same, a 
bit lower and much lower, enabling us to distinguish three categories – overskilled, 
matched and underskilled, based on the employees’ own perceptions of their skills 
                                                 
5 Unfortunately, the cross sectional nature of the data means it is not possible to consider the dynamics 
or persistence of skill mismatch. However, Blazquez and Malo (2005) find that mismatch has 
particularly severe consequences for the disabled as they have a lower probability of leaving this state 
to become matched and have a higher probability of exiting this state to unemployment or inactivity. 
6 Individuals should only answer the second question following a positive response to the first. A small 
number of mutually inconsistent responses are dropped from the analysis. Unfortunately, there is no 
further information about the nature of the disability which would enable us to control for productivity 
and work limitations more directly. 
7 Given employees form the entire sample, it is not possible to control for sample selection bias that 
may arise as a result of this.   6
and that required to do their job.
8 We do not attempt to estimate the extent of over and 
under-education in this paper. Though it is possible to impute it using the empirical 
method, a substantial number of respondents have other vocational qualifications, 
which are difficult to interpret in relation to their level. However, consistent with 
previous evidence (see, for example, Jones et al., 2006), the disabled are significantly 
less likely to have a first degree, A levels or AS levels than the non-disabled and 
significantly more likely to have no academic qualifications (see Table 1). 
Furthermore, the work-limited disabled are less well qualified than the non-work-
limited disabled. These differences would reduce the likelihood of finding that 
overeducation was a more serious problem for the disabled. It is not possible, for 
example, to be overeducated if you have no qualifications, which is the case for 
roughly a quarter of the disabled.  
 
The main limitation of our overskilling variable is that it is subjective, which means 
the responses of individuals may not be directly comparable.
9 However, there seems 
to be no obvious reason why disabled employees would consistently overestimate or 
underestimate their own skills or the demands of their employment relative to the 
non-disabled group.
10 The results in Table 2 show the disabled are significantly more 
likely to report having “much higher” skills than those required to do their job than 
the non-disabled and are significantly less likely to be matched. A greater proportion 
of the disabled also report being underskilled, but this sample is small and the 
                                                 
8 Overskilled includes much higher and a bit higher, whereas underskilled includes a bit lower and 
much lower.  A complete list of descriptive statistics is contained in appendix table 1. 
9 Overeducation has also been measured subjectively in most studies and there is no evidence that 
individuals exaggerate the extent to which the job requires the level of education they possess.  
10 In fact, if statistical discrimination exists, one may argue that disabled employees, in particular, are 
better placed than their employers to assess their work skills and abilities. It is also important to note 
that if there is any (negative) influence of their disability on work skills and abilities then this does not 
imply underskilling, since job requirements also vary and individuals are asked about their present job.   7
differences are not significant. In Table 3 the mean values are presented for seven 
facets of job satisfaction (each measured on a scale where 5 is very satisfied to 1 very 
dissatisfied) and an index of overall satisfaction which combines each of them.
11 The 
disabled have a significantly lower index of job satisfaction than the non-disabled. For 
the work limited disabled this also applies to each of the seven facets of job 
satisfaction, but for the non-work-limited disabled satisfaction is significantly lower 
only in the case of training
12 and pay. This is despite the fact that hourly pay is 
actually higher for the non-work-limited disabled (£9.77) than for the non-disabled 
(£9.55). The work-limited disabled have significantly lower pay (£8.90) than the non-
disabled. This emphasises the point that the differences between the non-work-limited 
disabled and the non-disabled are much less pronounced than the differences between 
the work-limited disabled and the non-disabled.  
 
One other feature of the data is worth noting, since there is relatively limited evidence 
which documents more detailed information about the nature of disabled employment. 
Regardless of the precise measure, the disabled report having less influence over their 
job. For example, 34.1% of the work-limited disabled report having little or no 
influence over the tasks you do in your job compared to 25.9% of the non-disabled; 
also, 23.1% of the work-limited disabled report having little or no influence over the 
                                                 
11  In this we follow Mumford and Smith (2008) who, using the same data set (but for a different 
purpose), calculated an aggregate measure of job satisfaction from six facets of job satisfaction by 
constructing a binary measure for each of them based on positive responses (satisfied or very satisfied) 
and summed them form a scaled index with values from 0 to 6. However, we use all seven facets of job 
satisfaction available in WERS. 
12  Respondents were asked “apart from health and safety training how much training have you had 
during the last 12 months, either paid for or organised by your employer?” 43.9% of the work-limited 
disabled responded none compared to 36.2% of the non-disabled and the difference was significant at 
the 1% level. The work-limited disabled were also significantly less likely to have received training of 
between 2-5 days or more than 10 days than the non-disabled. There was no significant difference 
between the training provision for the non-work-limited disabled and the non-disabled. Thus, one of 
the potential causes of the higher rates of skill mismatch is the lower rates of job related training for the 
work-limited disabled.   8
order in which you carry out tasks compared to 17.0% of the non-disabled. The 





                                                 
13 Preliminary analysis also suggests this is not just a consequence of the types of jobs the disabled 
hold.   9
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
(a) Determinants of mismatch 
The first stage is to estimate the determinants of under- and overskilling, 
distinguishing between non-work-limited and work-limited disabled. Since there are 
three possibilities, the multinominal logit model seems appropriate. This estimates 
two sets of coefficients,  1 β  (underskilled) and  3 β  (overskilled). From these two sets 
of coefficients we can calculate the probability Pij of an individual i being 
underskilled (j=1) or overskilled (j=3) conditional on a vector of characteristics  i x . 
The probability of individual i being under-(over)- skill group j (relative to the 
probability of being in the default group 2 (skill matched)) is given by 
)] ( exp[ 2
2
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WERS contains a rich set of covariates which, in addition to controls for disability 
status, include personal and workplace related characteristics. The controls for 
personal characteristics include gender, age, ethnicity (defined broadly as white or 
non-white), highest academic qualifications and marital status. We also control for   10
work related characteristics including part-time employment, having a temporary 
contract, union membership, tenure, (log of) workplace size, whether the workplace is 
part of a larger organisation as well as sector, industry, occupation and region of 
work. All the estimates from the econometric models are unweighted; but, in order to 
check for consistency, we also run weighted regressions. Generally, these produce 
consistent results. 
 
(b) Implications of mismatch on earnings and job satisfaction 
Next, we establish whether being disabled or skill mismatched has a detrimental 
effect on earnings. Since usual gross weekly pay is banded into 14 groups, interval 
regression is the appropriate procedure, as the dependent variable is categorised and 
ordered and the cut-off points are known. Under such circumstances, OLS regressions 
using the mid-point of the pay band may generate inconsistent estimates (Stewart, 
1983). In practice, OLS and the interval regression estimates produce very similar 
results so here we only present the former, which are easier to interpret. The midpoint 
of the pay band is adjusted for usual weekly hours to create a continuous measure of 
hourly pay.
14 The resulting earnings function is given by:  
 
i i i i i S S Z y η ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + = 3 3 2 1 1 ln         (4) 
 
where  i y ln  is the log of the derived measure of hourly pay and  i Z contains personal 
and employment related characteristics including educational attainment, occupation 
                                                 
14 Examination of the resulting distribution of hourly earnings suggests a number of outliers where high 
hourly earnings are generated because a relatively short number of hours are reported. In a similar 
manner to Dolton and Pelkonen (2008), we trim 1% off the upper and lower distribution of hourly 
wages and, reassuringly, the correlation between the derived pay measure and the mid point of the 
actual hourly pay measure (of which there are only 4 bands) is relatively high at 0.55.   11
and industry. Two dummy variables capture skill mismatch, namely, 1 i S , which 
captures individuals who are underksilled and 3 i S which captures those who are 
overskilled. 
 
We must, however, consider the nature of the matched employer – employee samples, 
as there is both a within establishment error term variance and an across establishment 
error term variance. Under such circumstances, random effects GLS is a less biased 
indicator than OLS (see Moulton, 1987). We present, also, random effects results for 
each of the three groups separately – the non-disabled, the non-work-limited disabled, 
and the work-limited disabled.
15 
 
Finally, we estimate an ordered probit to explain the determinants of job satisfaction, 
using a composite index of overall job satisfaction. We assume that satisfaction is 
measured by an unobserved latent variable 
*
i J  which is determined by: 
 
                      (5) 
 
The observed response, J, will take the value 0 if  1
* α ≤ J  while 
2
*
1 1 α α ≤ < = J if J  
3
*
2 2 α α ≤ < = J if J  
… 
*
1 J if K J K < = − α  
 
where K+1  is the number of alternative responses and  k α  are cut points. We include 
a set of personal and employment related controls, as well as the dummy variables for 
over- and under-skilling as determinants of job satisfaction. In a similar manner to the 
                                                 
15 The results are qualitatively similar, if instead, we control for workplace fixed effects. 
i i i i i S S Z J ε γ γ γ + + + = 3 3 2 1 1
*  12
analysis of earnings, we also control for unobserved workplace heterogeneity by 
estimating a random effects ordered probit model. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
(a)  Determinants of Mismatch 
The disabled are significantly more likely to be mismatched than the non-disabled 
(Table 4), the effect being stronger for the work-limited disabled as shown by the 
marginal effects in relation to underskilling, which is not significant for the non-work-
limited disabled. The work-limited disabled are nearly 6 percentage points more likely 
to be overskilled than the non-disabled, which is consistent with a situation where it is 
harder for the disabled to obtain a job, such that they are prepared to trade-off higher 
skills for employment.
16 Obviously this argument does not explain the greater 
prevalence of underskilling, but this is also consistent with the disabled being more 
constrained in job search.
17  
 
In contrast to the arguments of Frank (1978), we find women are less likely to be 
mismatched than men. This may, however, reflect the self-assessed nature of our 
dependent variable and the greater tendency for men to overestimate their own skills 
and abilities (see, for example, Waldman, 1994). Younger workers are more likely to 
be underskilled and less likely to be overskilled (though this is not reported in the 
table). Mismatch is also associated with shorter tenure and lower educational 
                                                 
16 Since both the work-limited and non-work-limited disabled have a higher probability of being 
overskilled, it suggests this is not entirely a consequence of differences in productivity but may reflect 
some discrimination against the entire disabled group. 
17 It may also reflect a lack of employer sponsored training among the disabled. We did experiment by 
including training in the multinominal logit, but there is potential reverse causation, since the 
overskilled are less likely to be offered training. Its inclusion does not alter the main results discussed 
above.   13
qualifications. However, vocational qualifications significantly increase the 
probability of being mismatched. Members of ethnic minorities are significantly more 
likely to be overskilled, again consistent perhaps with preparedness to trade-off skills 
to obtain a job. In contrast, single or married individuals, or those living with a 
partner, are less likely to be overskilled than those who are widowed, divorced or 
separated. 
 
As regards to structural factors, overskilling is positively associated with working in a 
larger workplace where perhaps management – worker relations are less close and is 
less likely to be present in single establishments where similar considerations may 
apply in reverse. We also constructed an index of worker control over their jobs 
which combined the ability to influence tasks, the pace of work, how the individual 
does the work, the order of work and time of arrival and finish of work (e.g. 
flexitime). This index was found to have a strong negative impact on the probability 
of being overskilled and seems also to have important implications for the design of 
jobs.  
 
Though not reported in Table 3, the model includes a full set of controls for industry 
and occupation. Underskilling is significantly more prevalent in manufacturing, 
electricity, gas and water and public administration and less so in education than the 
omitted sector (other community services), while overskilling is significantly less 
prevalent in construction, financial services, other business services, education and   14
health. The more skilled the occupation the stronger the probability of underskilling 




(b)  The Effects on Earnings 
Table 5 presents the results of OLS and random effects earnings equations and 
columns (3-5) split the sample into non-disabled, non-work-limited disabled and 
work-limited disabled respectively. The non-work-limited disabled suffer no wage 
penalty as a result of their status, consistent with the absence of an unobserved 
productivity effect. However, there is a significant wage effect of around 5% for those 
who are work-limited disabled, being slightly smaller under random effects 
estimation. Similarly, there is no significant wage difference to being underskilled, 
but the overskilled suffer a significant wage reduction of around 3%, consistent with 
the reduced productivity of an overskilled individual relative to an otherwise identical 
individual who is better matched. When the sample is split, the penalty to being 
overskilled is about 2% for the non-disabled, 6% for the non-work-limited disabled 
and 10% for the work-limited disabled. This is not surprising since the extent of 
overskilling reported by the work-limited disabled is greater. However, even after 
controlling for the extent of overskilling, the disabled face a greater wage penalty 
from being in any given overskilled status.
19 The other variables behave as expected,
 
but it is worth noting that the pay penalty for work-limited disabled women is less 
                                                 
18 We also experimented with the inclusion of the availability of equal opportunity policies for the 
disabled, whether there was monitoring of recruitment, promotion and pay of the disabled, whether the 
firm had made a formal assessment of the extent to which the workplace was accessible by the disabled 
and if the workplace had made adjustments to accommodate the disabled. Only the last of these 
significantly reduced the probability of being overskilled. 
19 Results are not reported but specifications were estimated with separate controls for being severely 
and moderately overskilled. As expected the wage penalty is greater for the severely overskilled.   15
than for women in the other groups.
20 Further, the work-limited disabled suffer a 
much larger pay penalty for being employed in a single establishment employer and 
gain no pay benefit from being employed in the public sector. All groups benefit from 
an ability to control the nature of their work. 
 
(c)  Effects on Job Satisfaction 
Few papers have considered the relationship between disability and job satisfaction. 
One exception is Pagan and Malo (2009) who use Spanish data from the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) over the period 1995-2001. They find that the 
disabled have higher job satisfaction than the non disabled, which they attribute to 
lower expectations about jobs on the part of disabled workers. It should, however, be 
noted that the definition of disability is different in the EHCP as it refers to limitations 
on daily activities. They also acknowledge the alternative hypothesis that disabled 
workers are more likely to have lower job satisfaction due to the fact that they may 
have poorer health status, which finds support in some empirical studies in North 
America.
21 In particular, Uppal (2005) finds that, even after controlling for personal 
characteristics, the disabled are less satisfied in work in Canada. In our case, the non-
work-limited disabled and the work-limited disabled have significantly lower job 
satisfaction than the non-disabled (Table 6) and, again, it is the work-limited who are 
worst off.
22 Both those who are underskilled and those who are overskilled have 
significantly lower job satisfaction than those who are properly matched, although the 
                                                 
20 The sole exception to this is the positive association between part-time work and hourly earnings. 
This appears to be a consequence of measurement error in reported hours of work. However, the key 
results discussed above are not sensitive to restricting the sample to full-time workers.  
21 Disability and health are distinct concepts but may be correlated. We have no information on health 
to try and distinguish between the influence of health and disability on job satisfaction.  
22 Consistent with this the work limited disabled are more likely to strongly agree with the following 
statements my job requires that I work very hard, I never seem to have enough time to get my work 
done, I worry a lot about my work outsideworking hours and strongly disagree with I feel my job is 
secure in this workplace.   16
marginal effects indicate being underskilled has a slightly more adverse impact on job 
satisfaction than being overskilled. Further, in contrast to the results from Pagan and 
Malo (2009), who find overeducation has no influence on the job satisfaction of the 
disabled, we find both over- and underskilled disabled workers have lower job 
satisfaction relative to those who are correctly matched.
23  
 
The other controls generally have the expected influence, with women and those with 
short tenure having higher satisfaction, whereas those with higher level academic 
qualifications, those on temporary contracts and those from ethnic minorities having 
lower job satisfaction. The ability to control one’s own work has a highly significant 





It is well known that the disabled are less likely to participate in the labour market 
than the non-disabled and those who do so suffer a pay penalty if they are work-
limited disabled. In this paper we consider the possibility that the disabled may be 
more prone than the non-disabled to skill mismatch. This is, indeed, confirmed by our 
regression analysis, both with respect to underskilling and overskilling. We are able to 
confirm that there is a pay penalty to being disabled, but this is only significant for the 
work-limited disabled and there is an additional pay penalty to being overskilled (but 
not underskilled) which is larger for the disabled. Likewise, the disabled (particularly 
                                                 
23 An alternative specification was estimated with controls for the extent of overskilling and while 
being severely or moderately overskilled reduced the job satisfaction for non-disabled workers, for the 
work-limited disabled only severe overskilling that has a significant adverse effect on job satisfaction. 
24 Again, we examined the robustness of the results to the inclusion of a control for the presence of 
equal opportunities policy for the disabled, but this appears to have no impact on the level of job 
satisfaction. Further, controlling for the level of hourly pay (which significantly raises job satisfaction) 
does not affect the above conclusions.   17
those who are work-limited) have lower job satisfaction than the non-disabled and 
skill mismatch further lowers job satisfaction.  
 
Our results suggest that reducing the extent of this mismatch in the labour market 
would improve the earnings and satisfaction of disabled employees, the second of 
which has previously been found to be an important indicator of quit behaviour 
(Freeman, 1978) and may, therefore, aid government efforts to increase the 
employment rate among this group. Employers could be encouraged to assess the 
skills and abilities of disabled employees more formally, in order to reduce the extent 
of perceived skill mismatch. The evidence also suggests that giving workers greater 
discretion over how they perform their work tasks would have similar results. Greater 
flexibility for disabled employees in this respect would seem consistent with the 
reasonable adjustment element of the UK Disability Discrimination Act, as well as 
providing potential benefits to both employees and employers.  
   18
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Table 1. Academic qualifications by disability status. 
 
  Highest academic qualification 




Higher Degree  6.64  6.14  5.85 
First Degree  20.04  17.40**  14.68*** 
A level or AS level  15.02  13.14*  10.10*** 
GSCE level (grade C)  25.69  24.92  24.46 
Other 16.22  16.04  19.89** 
None 16.39  22.37***  25.02*** 
Notes to table: Data are weighted. ‘*’ ‘**’ ‘***’ denote significance from the non-disabled group at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 2. Skill mismatch by disability status. 
 
  How well do the work skills you personally have match the skills       
you need to do your present job? 
 Non-disabled  Non-work-limiting  disabled Work-limiting  disabled 
Much higher  21.02  25.50***  29.56*** 
A bit higher   32.25  31.69  29.97 
About the same  42.37  37.87***  35.15*** 
A bit lower  3.68  4.08  4.26 
Much lower  0.68  0.86  1.07 
Notes to table: Data are weighted. ‘*’ ‘**’ ‘***’ denote significance from the non-disabled group at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 3. Job satisfaction by disability status. 
 








The sense of achievement you get 
from your work 
3.76 3.78  3.57*** 
 The scope for using your 
own initiative 
3.82 3.81  3.61*** 
The amount of influence you have 
over your job 
3.56 3.53  3.30*** 
The training you receive  3.34  3.23***  3.11*** 
The amount of pay you receive  2.88  2.76***  2.71*** 
Your job security  3.61  3.57  3.36*** 
The work itself  3.78  3.77  3.62*** 
Index of satisfaction  4.27  4.15*  3.72*** 
Notes to table: Data are weighted. ‘*’ ‘**’ ‘***’ denote significance from the non-disabled group at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. With the exception of the index of satisfaction, figures are average 
job satisfaction scores on a ranked scale where 5=very satisfied and 1=very dissatisfied. The index of 





   21
Table 4. Multinomial logit model of the determinants of skill mismatch. 
 
 Coefficients  Marginal  effects 
 Underskilled  Overskilled  Underskilled  Overskilled 
Constant -2.038***  1.159***     
 (4.55)  (6.59)     
Non-work-limited disabled  0.329**  0.224***  0.008  0.047*** 
  (2.34) (3.71) (1.35) (3.34) 
Work-limited  disabled  0.634***  0.304*** 0.021** 0.057*** 
  (4.02) (3.95) (2.52) (3.24) 
Female -0.314***  -0.292***  -0.006*  -0.066*** 
  (3.58) (7.77) (1.74) (7.30) 
Tenure less than a year  0.463***  0.112**  0.017***  0.016 
  (3.64) (1.98) (2.86) (1.21) 
Tenure 1-2 years  0.153  0.313***  -0.001  0.073*** 
  (1.08) (5.45) (0.24) (5.46) 
Tenure 2-5 years  0.086  0.122***  0.001  0.028*** 
  (0.76) (2.68) (0.15) (2.59) 
Tenure 5-10 years  -0.068  0.095**  -0.004  0.025** 
  (0.54) (1.99) (1.04) (2.16) 
Any vocational qualification   0.106  0.265***  -0.002  0.064*** 
  (1.29) (7.52) (0.50) (7.48) 
No academic qualifications  -0.534***  -0.942***  -0.003  -0.221*** 
  (2.82) (11.13) (0.45) (11.60) 
Other academic qualifications  -0.500**  -0.529***  -0.008  -0.123*** 
  (2.36) (5.77) (1.25) (5.61) 
GCSE level qualifications   -0.611***  -0.447***  -0.013**  -0.099*** 
  (3.90) (6.18) (2.54) (5.71) 
A level qualifications  -0.535***  -0.204***  -0.014***  -0.041** 
  (3.16) (2.65) (2.98) (2.21) 
Degree level qualifications  -0.328**  -0.086  -0.010**  -0.015 
  (2.20) (1.23) (2.10) (0.89) 
Single   0.014  -0.181***  0.004  -0.045*** 
  (0.09) (2.73) (0.71) (2.82) 
Married   -0.096  -0.106**  -0.001  -0.024* 
  (0.71) (1.99) (0.28) (1.88) 
Non-white 0.012  0.174**  -0.003  0.043** 
  (0.07) (2.40) (0.56) (2.49) 
Log workplace size  0.040  0.039***  0.001  0.009*** 
  (1.56) (3.70) (0.72) (3.47) 
Single establishment  0.102  -0.120***  0.007  -0.032*** 
  (1.01) (2.80) (1.63) (3.09) 
Public  sector  -0.118 -0.071 -0.003 -0.015 
  (0.89) (1.36) (0.61) (1.20) 
Control index  -0.091***  -0.013***  -0.003***  -0.001 
  (8.79) (2.82) (8.56) (1.14) 
Likelihood ratio
2 χ   1031.31 
[0.00] 
Observations 18788 
Notes to table: Data are unweighted. Model also includes controls for age, temporary contracts, part-
time employment, presence of children and a full set of regional, occupational and industrial dummy 
variables which are not reported here. T statistics reported in parenthesis. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The base category is having correctly matched 
skills. The figure in square brackets is a p-value based on the likelihood ratio test where the null 
hypothesis is that the slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero.   22
 
Table 5. The determinants of hourly earnings 
 
  OLS  Random Effects GLS 








Constant 1.870***  1.814***  1.811***  1.812***  1.939*** 
  (66.00)  (52.25) (49.75) (16.83) (14.26) 
Non-work-limited disabled  -0.001  0.001       
 (0.14)  (0.07)       
Work-limited disabled  -0.057***  -0.047***       
 (4.79)  (4.19)       
Female  -0.127***  -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.125*** -0.095*** 
 (21.12)  (19.27)  (18.47)  (5.32)  (3.24) 
Tenure less than a year  -0.110***  -0.108***  -0.108***  -0.070**  -0.134*** 
 (12.30)  (12.36)  (11.60)  (2.03)  (2.81) 
Tenure 1-2 years  -0.099***  -0.093***  -0.096***  -0.054  -0.066 
 (10.78)  (10.49)  (10.16)  (1.52)  (1.44) 
Tenure 2-5 years  -0.065***  -0.068***  -0.067***  -0.041  -0.090*** 
 (8.93)  (9.65)  (8.92)  (1.49)  (2.62) 
Tenure 5-10 years  -0.047***  -0.044***  -0.047***  -0.015  -0.044 
 (6.20)  (5.92)  (5.89)  (0.53)  (1.29) 
0.041*** 0.041***  0.038***  0.040*  0.089***  Any vocational 
qualification  (7.19) (7.52)  (6.54)  (1.80)  (3.10) 
No academic qualifications  -0.354***  -0.317***  -0.319***  -0.371***  -0.347*** 
 (26.42)  (24.39)  (23.01)  (7.16)  (5.34) 
-0.272***  -0.247*** -0.244*** -0.329*** -0.299***  Other academic 
qualifications  (18.68) (17.65)  (16.33) (5.85)  (4.38) 
GCSE level qualifications   -0.234***  -0.214***  -0.214***  -0.263***  -0.268*** 
 (20.57)  (19.51)  (18.38)  (5.65)  (4.58) 
A level qualifications  -0.155***  -0.139***  -0.140***  -0.140***  -0.195*** 
 (12.80)  (11.92)  (11.36)  (2.85)  (2.98) 
Degree level qualifications  -0.056***  -0.057***  -0.054***  -0.080*  -0.122** 
 (5.08)  (5.40)  (4.88)  (1.76)  (2.03) 
Part-time work  0.028***  0.060***  0.062***  0.023  -0.001 
 (3.90)  (8.53)  (8.24)  (0.82)  (0.03) 
Trade union member  0.061***  0.058***  0.060***  0.053**  0.066** 
  (10.10) (9.33) (8.93) (2.36) (2.30) 
Single -0.037***  -0.031***  -0.032***  0.005  -0.082 
 (3.54)  (3.11)  (2.95)  (0.12)  (1.59) 
Married   0.017**  0.015*  0.017**  0.024  -0.028 
 (2.00)  (1.84)  (2.04)  (0.78)  (0.69) 
Non-white -0.073***  -0.058***  -0.061***  -0.028  -0.106* 
 (6.36)  (5.09)  (5.10)  (0.55)  (1.82) 
Log workplace size  0.021***  0.023***  0.022***  0.023***  0.029*** 
  (12.38) (8.49) (8.06) (3.38) (3.12) 
Single organisation  -0.015**  -0.015  -0.008  -0.033  -0.107*** 
 (2.20)  (1.34)  (0.69)  (1.11)  (2.88) 
Public sector   0.034***  0.039***  0.044***  0.054  -0.058 
 (4.11)  (2.85)  (3.16)  (1.58)  (1.36) 
Underskill 0.006  -0.003  0.001  -0.036  -0.002 
 (0.49)  (0.26)  (0.06)  (0.75)  (0.03) 
Overskill -0.032***  -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.060***  -0.103***   23
 (6.19)  (5.16)  (4.10)  (2.94)  (3.95) 
Index of control  0.013***  0.012***  0.012***  0.012***  0.008*** 
 (17.89)  (17.53)  (16.64)  (4.37)  (2.59) 
R-squared  (overall)  0.53  0.53 0.54 0.51 0.48 
F-test 331.23 
[0.00] 
    
Wald








Number of workplaces  - 1717  1709  867  618 
Observations 18174  18174  16003  1346  825 
Notes to table: Data are unweighted. Model also includes controls for age, temporary contracts, part-
time employment and a full set of regional, occupational and industrial dummy variables which are not 
reported here. T statistics reported in parenthesis. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level respectively. The figures in square brackets are p-values based on the F-test or Wald test 
where the null hypothesis is that the slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
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Table 6. The determinants of job satisfaction 
 
  Ordered probit  Random effects ordered probit model  








-0.087*** -0.076**        Non-work-limited 
disabled  (2.92) (2.47)       
-0.216*** -0.214***        Work-limited 
disabled  (5.77) (5.58)       
Female 0.102***  0.103***  0.087***  0.264***  0.229** 
 (5.38)  (5.24)  (4.11)  (3.64)  (2.42) 
Tenure less than a 
year 
0.208*** 0.226***  0.223*** 0.223**  0.381** 
 (7.34)  (7.63)  (7.06)  (2.06)  (2.50) 
Tenure 1-2 years  0.058**  0.060**  0.035  0.323***  0.165 
 (2.03)  (2.01)  (1.10)  (2.91)  (1.15) 
Tenure 2-5 years  0.022  0.023  0.020  0.119  0.021 
 (0.96)  (0.98)  (0.78)  (1.41)  (0.19) 
Tenure 5-10 years  0.030  0.035  0.030  0.061  0.084 
 (1.22)  (1.38)  (1.10)  (0.71)  (0.75) 
0.061*** 0.054***  0.059***  0.063  -0.032  Any vocational 
qualification   (3.44) (2.95)  (3.00) (0.92)  (0.35) 
0.277*** 0.276***  0.265***  0.164  0.658***  No academic 
qualifications  (6.58) (6.29)  (5.64) (1.03)  (3.21) 
Other academic   0.206***  0.210***  0.198***  -0.006  0.733*** 
 (4.49)  (4.43)  (3.89)  (0.04)  (3.34) 
GCSE level   0.095***  0.098***  0.075*  0.088  0.442** 
 (2.66)  (2.65)  (1.92)  (0.61)  (2.36) 
A level   0.044  0.054  0.034  0.026  0.456** 
 (1.16)  (1.37)  (0.83)  (0.17)  (2.18) 
Degree level   0.050  0.049  0.027  0.014  0.397** 
 (1.45)  (1.37)  (0.71)  (0.10)  (2.07) 
Temporary   -0.217***  -0.241***  -0.261***  -0.117  -0.042 
 (6.84)  (7.30)  (7.46)  (0.93)  (0.24) 
Part-time 0.140***  0.129***  0.141***  -0.017  0.128 
 (6.39)  (5.68)  (5.79)  (0.20)  (1.24) 
-0.064*** -0.066***  -0.075***  -0.038  -0.017  Trade union 
member  (3.38) (3.17)  (3.39) (0.55)  (0.18) 
Single -0.060*  -0.071**  -0.082**  -0.054  0.119 
 (1.79)  (2.08)  (2.23)  (0.43)  (0.73) 
Married   0.009  -0.004  -0.017  0.065  0.132 
 (0.34)  (0.14)  (0.56)  (0.67)  (1.02) 
Children 0.007  0.003  0.002  0.017  0.017 
 (0.39)  (0.13)  (0.08)  (0.22)  (0.18) 
Non-white -0.086**  -0.069*  -0.074*  0.070  -0.158 
 (2.36)  (1.79)  (1.81)  (0.42)  (0.83) 
-0.030*** -0.030***  -0.030*** -0.051**  0.010  Log workplace 
size  (5.64) (4.16)  (4.00) (2.53)  (0.38) 
0.064*** 0.079***  0.060*  0.199**  0.216*  Single 
establishment  (2.94) (2.66)  (1.92) (2.36)  (1.95) 
Public sector  -0.045*  -0.044  -0.029  -0.173*  -0.030 
 (1.73)  (1.22)  (0.76)  (1.78)  (0.24) 
Underskilled -0.473***  -0.462***  -0.442***  -0.538***  -0.717*** 
 (12.20)  (11.63)  (10.30)  (3.68)  (4.17)   25
Overskilled -0.300***  -0.300***  -0.309*** -0.284*** -0.230*** 
 (18.46)  (17.98)  (17.37)  (4.50)  (2.75) 
Control index  0.134***  0.140***  0.139***  0.146***  0.144*** 
 (56.41)  (56.54)  (52.22)  (15.37)  (11.67) 
Cut point 1  -0.898***  -0.934***  -1.000***  -1.048***  0.359 
 (9.97)  (8.93)  (8.95)  (3.23)  (0.86) 
Cut point 2  -0.362***  -0.374***  -0.440***  -0.523  0.967** 
 (4.02)  (3.59)  (3.95)  (1.61)  (2.31) 
Cut point 3  0.046  0.050  -0.017  -0.050  1.351*** 
 (0.51)  (0.48)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (3.22) 
Cut point 4   0.431***  0.450***  0.384***  0.370  1.729*** 
 (4.80)  (4.32)  (3.45)  (1.13)  (4.11) 
Cut point 5  0.878***  0.915***  0.851***  0.834**  2.169*** 
 (9.76)  (8.76)  (7.63)  (2.54)  (5.14) 
Cut point 6  1.380***  1.439***  1.370***  1.383***  2.758*** 
 (15.33)  (13.75)  (12.26)  (4.18)  (6.45) 
Cut point 7  2.088***  2.176***  2.107***  2.178***  3.418*** 
 (23.09)  (20.73)  (18.79)  (6.47)  (7.84) 
Rho   0.078***  0.080***  0.020  0.040 
   (13.40)  (12.69)  (0.42)  (0.49) 
Likelihood 
ratio











Observations 18028  18028  15894  1318  816 
Notes to table: Data are unweighted. Model also includes controls for age, a full set of regional, 
occupational and industrial dummy variables which are not reported here. T statistics reported in 
parenthesis. ‘*’, ‘**’, ‘***’ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The figures 
in square brackets are p-values based on the likelihood ratio test where the null hypothesis is that the 
slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
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Appendix Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 






Log hourly pay  Log of hourly pay (midpoint band of weekly pay/usual weekly hours).   2.163  2.189  2.104 
Overskill  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee reports their work skills are much 
higher or a bit higher than those required to do their present job; 0 
otherwise. 
0.528 0.570  0.592 
Underskill  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee reports their work skills are much 
higher or a bit lower than those required to do their present job; 0 
otherwise. 
0.044 0.046  0.061 
Job satisfaction  Scale from 0-7 indicating increasing satisfaction with job.
25 4.256  4.077  3.632 
Female  Dummy variable if female; 0 otherwise  0.540  0.498  0.476 
Single  Dummy variable if marital status is single; 0 otherwise  0.229  0.167  0.187 
Married  Dummy variable if marital status is married or living with partner; 0 
otherwise 
0.673 0.728  0.707 
Separated/Divorced  
(omitted) 
Dummy variable if marital status is either separated or divorced; 0 
otherwise 
0.098 0.105  0.106 
Children  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has dependent children; 0 otherwise  0.403  0.319  0.339 
Non-white  Dummy variable equals 1 if non-white ethnic group (mixed, asian, black or 
chinese); 0 otherwise 
0.061 0.044  0.048 
Age  16-17  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 16 and 17; 0 
otherwise 
0.012 0.004  0.006 
Age  18-19  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 18 and 19; 0 
otherwise 
0.024 0.009  0.014 
Age  20-21  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 20 and 21; 0  0.028  0.014  0.006 
                                                 
25 The scale is constructed by summing binary indicators for satisfaction with achievement at work, scope for using your own initiative, amount of influence over job, training 
received, pay received, job security and the work itself. For each binary variable 1 indicates very satisfied or satisfied and 0 else.    27
otherwise 
Age  22-29  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 22 and 29; 0 
otherwise 
0.164 0.095  0.078 
Age  30-39  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 30 and 39; 0 
otherwise 
0.262 0.158  0.199 
Age  40-49  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 40 and 49; 0 
otherwise 
0.266 0.268  0.295 
Age  50-59    Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged between 50 and 59; 0 
otherwise 
0.202 0.365  0.331 
Age 60+ (omitted)  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is aged 60 and over; 0 otherwise  0.042  0.086  0.070 
Tenure <1 year  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace 
for less than 1 year; 0 otherwise 
0.163 0.132  0.109 
Tenure 1-2 years  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace 
for between 1 and 2 years; 0 otherwise 
0.131 0.112  0.107 
Tenure 2-5 years  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace 
for between 2 and 5 years; 0 otherwise 
0.273 0.232  0.229 
Tenure 5-10 years  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace 
for between 5 and 10 years; 0 otherwise 
0.185 0.195  0.203 
Tenure 10 years+ (omitted)  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has been working at this workplace 
for more than 10 years; 0 otherwise 
0.249 0.330  0.353 
Any vocational qualification   Dummy variable equals 1 if employee has any type of vocational 
qualification; 0 otherwise 
0.641 0.667  0.659 
No academic qualifications  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is 
none; 0 otherwise 
0.151 0.207  0.227 
Other academic qualifications  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is 
other (includes GCSE grades D-G); 0 otherwise 
0.063 0.079  0.093 
GCSE level  
academic qualifications 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is 
GCSE level (grades A*-C); 0 otherwise 
0.354 0.329  0.364 
A level academic 
qualifications 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is A 
level or AS level; 0 otherwise 
0.150 0.133  0.110 
Degree level academic 
qualifications 
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is 
degree level; 0 otherwise 
0.211 0.188  0.149   28
Higher degree level 
qualifications (omitted)  
Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s highest academic qualification is 
higher degree level (masters degree or PhD); 0 otherwise 
0.070 0.064  0.057 
Temporary  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is on a temporary or fixed period 
contract; 0 otherwise 
0.079 0.069  0.065 
Part-time  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee usually works less than 30 hours per 
week; 0 otherwise 
0.220 0.196  0.249 
Trade union member  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee is a member of a trade union or staff 
association; 0 otherwise 
0.355 0.455  0.483 
Occupation 1  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is manager or senior 
official; 0 otherwise  
0.114 0.117  0.085 
Occupation  2  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is professional; 0 
otherwise  
0.121 0.126  0.105 
Occupation  3  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is associate 
professional and technical; 0 otherwise 
0.170 0.155  0.144 
Occupation 4  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is administrative and 
secretarial; 0 otherwise  
0.190 0.187  0.187 
Occupation  5  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is skilled trades; 0 
otherwise  
0.066 0.065  0.098 
Occupation 6  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is services; 0 otherwise  0.089  0.086  0.086 
Occupation 7  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is sales and customer 
services; 0 otherwise 
0.070 0.056  0.065 
Occupation 8  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is process, plant and 
machine operatives; 0 otherwise  
0.071 0.089  0.104 
Occupation  9  (omitted)  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee’s occupation is elementary; 0 
otherwise  
0.110 0.119  0.128 
Industry 1  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the manufacturing industry; 
0 otherwise  
0.146 0.144  0.186 
Industry 2  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the electricity, water and 
gas  industry; 0 otherwise  
0.018 0.019  0.022 
Industry 3   Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the construction industry; 0 
otherwise  
0.047 0.038  0.049 
Industry 4  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the wholesale and retail  0.099  0.084  0.098   29
trade; 0 otherwise  
Industry 5  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the hotel and restaurant 
industry; 0 otherwise  
0.026 0.019  0.019 
Industry  6  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the transport and 
communication industry; 0 otherwise  
0.062 0.068  0.073 
Industry  7  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the financial services 
industry; 0 otherwise  
0.063 0.055  0.047 
Industry 8  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in other business services; 0 
otherwise  
0.116 0.116  0.086 
Industry 9  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in public administration; 0 
otherwise  
0.081 0.110  0.101 
Industry 10  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in the education; 0 otherwise  0.121  0.118  0.107 
Industry 11  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in health; 0 otherwise   0.159  0.181  0.161 
Industry 12 (omitted)  Dummy variable equals 1 if employee works in other community services; 
0 otherwise  
0.061 0.050  0.050 
Region  1  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the North East; 0 
otherwise  
0.041 0.045  0.040 
Region 2  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the North West; 0 
otherwise  
0.137 0.140  0.140 
Region  3  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in Yorkshire and 
Humberside; 0  
0.092 0.096  0.119 
Region 4  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the East Midlands; 0 
otherwise  
0.067 0.070  0.070 
Region 5  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the West Midlands; 0 
otherwise  
0.097 0.087  0.092 
Region 6  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the East of England; 0 
otherwise  
0.091 0.082  0.093 
Region 7  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in London; 0 otherwise   0.104  0.107  0.080 
Region  8  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the South East; 0 
otherwise  
0.124 0.119  0.112 
Region 9  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in the South West; 0 
otherwise  
0.088 0.083  0.087   30
Region 10  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in Scotland; 0 otherwise   0.112  0.113  0.106 
Region 11 (omitted)  Dummy variable equals 1 if workplace is located in Wales; 0 otherwise   0.046  0.059  0.058 
Single establishment  Dummy  variable  equals 1 if workplace is a single independent 
establishment not belonging to another body; 0 otherwise 
0.184 0.171  0.185 
Public  Dummy variable equals 1 if public ownership; 0 otherwise  0.312  0.362  0.352 
Log workplace size  Log of the total number of employees in workplace.  4.764  4.803  4.814 
Control index  Scale from 0-15 indicating greater control over nature of employment.
26 9.966  9.865  9.167 
Notes to table: Data are unweighted.  
 
 
                                                 
26 Creating by summing the following: influence over tasks, over pace of work, over how work is done, over order of work and on start/finish time. Each is ranked from 0-3 
where 0 indicates no control and 3 indicates a lot of control.  